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 The Economics of Endangered Species Poaching
1 Introduction
The poaching of endangered species is a global problem. In Africa elephants are poached
for their ivory and rhinoceroses are poached to produce medicinal products from their
horns (Fischer 2004). In North America grizzly bears are poached because their body
parts are valuable, particularly gall bladders (Unknown 2004). In southwestern British
Columbia there have been increasing occurrences of bald eagle poaching for the value
of their feathers, but one poacher was only ﬁned $1450 (Keating 2007). In a letter to
the editor an outraged citizen called for greater penalties for those caught poaching as a
means of deterrence (Foss 2007). This brings up an important point that has not received
enough attention in the economics literature: poaching is a criminal activity and poachers
make the same economic decisions as other criminals. The focus of this paper, therefore,
is to examine the interaction between the economic decision making of poachers and the
dynamics of endangered species.
The literature regarding endangered species poaching has evolved largely in the context
of the African elephant. One of the general goals of this literature has been to understand
the impacts of an international trade moratorium on the survival of an endangered species.
A common method by which researchers have contributed to the understanding of this
subject is to examine the static impact on quantity poached that results from a policy
change. For example, Fischer (2004) and Bergstrom (1990) develop static models to
analyze policy changes. While such analyses provide valuable insights, a more complete
approach would be to assess how policy changes would eﬀect the population dynamics
of the species. Under certain circumstances, policies will have ambiguous eﬀects on the
quantity of the resource that is poached, but this does not necessarily imply that the
impact on the species population will also be ambiguous. It may still be possible to
1determine how the potential steady states of the species population will change.
Two notable examples of work that examines changes in both the amount of poaching
that occurs and the steady state resource population are Bulte and Damania (2001) and
Kremer and Morcom (2000). Bulte and Damania examine the role of captive breeding
in endangered species conservation in the context of imperfect competition. Kremer and
Morcom investigate the possible impacts of storage on endangered species equilibria. Both
studies use dynamic frameworks and provide results regarding steady state populations to
give a complete account of the impact of policy on the vitality of the endangered species.
There has been considerable controversy over the ban on international trade in ivory.
Thornton et al. (2000) report that the one-oﬀ sales of ivory in Zimbabwe, Botswana and
Namibia in 1997 led to an upsurge in poaching. Bulte, van Kooten and Damania (2007)
ﬁnd that on a broad scale there have not been lasting increases in elephant mortality
caused by the one-oﬀ sale, except perhaps in some speciﬁc remote regions. Similarly,
Milliken et al. (2004) conclude that one-oﬀ sales of ivory do not create onerous market
signals. Fully legalizing trade is arguably a much diﬀerent subject than one-oﬀ sales. In an
unrestricted market there would be much less control and accountability in terms of where
products originate. Heltberg (2001) ﬁnds that the impacts of imposing a trade ban, as
opposed full legal trade, are ambiguous, but concludes that an international ban on ivory
trade is likely to reduce poaching if it facilitates the interception of smugglers. Bulte and
van Kooten (1999) ﬁnd that the elephant stocks in Namibia will be higher under a trade
ban regime than without one. Basic economic theory supports legal trade: if conﬁscated
ivory is not sold in the market, the price received by poachers will consequently rise and
give a greater incentive to poach (Bergstrom 1990). Fischer (2004) points out that, if legal
sales of ivory eﬀect poaching, there must be a link from illegally harvested ivory to legally
harvested ivory through a mechanism like laundering. The role of banning international
trade may be to make it more costly for poachers to get their product to the market as
2laundering is no longer an option. In this context, allowing one-oﬀ sales may let poachers
into the market through corruption, similar to the ﬁndings of Smith et al. (2003).
The eﬀect of increasing anti-poaching enforcement has been the subject of some debate.
Fischer (2004) ﬁnds that, when there is a single market in which endangered species
are sold, greater enforcement unambiguously reduces poaching if conﬁscated resources
are sold in the market. If conﬁscated resources are not sold in the market, increased
enforcement has ambiguous eﬀects on poaching that depend on the elasticity of demand.
Fischer also ﬁnds that when separate markets for legal and illegal harvests exist, the eﬀect
of increasing enforcement is ambiguous even if conﬁscated resources are sold. What is
neglected in these studies is how increasing anti-poaching enforcement will impact the
population of the endangered species.
Most researchers model poaching as a competitive industry by imposing the condition
that price equals marginal cost. Empirical evidence to support or dispute this assumption
is essentially non-existent. Bulte and Damania (2001) argue that this assumption is
overly simplistic and show that assuming imperfect competition has a bearing on results.
Another approach to modeling poaching behavior that has received only limited attention
is one in which poachers are modeled as criminals (Messer 2000). A benchmark model of
criminal activity is that of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), in which agents can divide
their working time between legal and criminal activities. Positive theory regarding the
role of law enforcement and the diﬀering eﬀects of positive and negative incentives emerge
from an analysis using this framework.
A key component of crime models is the separation of the various costs faced by
criminals. Opportunity costs associated with foregone legitimate employment, the costs
of sanctions imposed against criminals in the case of apprehension, and the likelihood of
apprehension itself are all treated separately. In the context of poaching, a model that
separates various costs would provide a richer framework for analyzing the eﬃcacy of trade
3bans, increased enforcement and changes in sanctions, such as shoot on sight policies. In
a model of perfect competition, in which costs are not diﬀerentiated, detailed analysis
of policy alternatives is not as easily accomplished. Some past models of poaching have
provided some cost diﬀerentiation, such as Bulte and van Kooten (1999) who use a per
unit cost as well as an expected apprehension cost, but do not explicitly model poaching
as a criminal activity.
A dynamic model of endangered species poaching is developed in this paper. Poachers
are modeled as criminals who make optimizing decisions between legitimate employment
and poaching. The optimal decision of poachers in the model is governed by the various
distinct costs and market incentives that they face. The market for endangered species
products is modeled as a general demand curve and a supply curve that depends on the
poacher’s decision. Equilibrium in the model requires that poachers make optimal choices
and that the market for products from endangered species clears. The feedback between
these two elements plays a considerable role in analysis of policy alternatives.
Policy analyses using the model developed here lead to not only static results regarding
the amount of poaching that takes place, but also dynamic results regarding the poten-
tial steady-state equilibria of the endangered species itself. Policy alternatives analyzed
include enforcement measures, criminal sanctions and international trade moratoriums.
Static results are, for the most part, consistent with previous literature. The dynamic
results regarding endangered species population dynamics provide signiﬁcant insights into
policy alternatives. These dynamic results are potentially very important as they indi-
cate that trade moratoriums, increased anti-poaching enforcement and increased poaching
penalties can all save a species that would otherwise become extinct.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the model of
endangered species poaching, section three analyzes endangered species policy alternatives
and section four discusses and concludes.
42 A Model of Endangered Species Poaching
2.1 Poaching Behavior
Poaching behavior follows closely the crime model of Erlich (1973) and Becker (1968).
Poaching agents are assumed to be risk neutral and have utility that is an increasing
function of income, such that u′(Y ) > 0 and u′′(Y ) = 0. The assumption of risk neutrality
is required to make the model tractable and intuitive. Individuals are usually assumed
to be risk averse, however, by the very nature of their choices, poachers are likely to be
more risk inclined than the average person. This implies that risk neutral may not be
unrealistic.
There are two states of the world in this model: state A in which the poacher is caught
occurs with probability π, and state B in which the poacher is not caught occurs with
probability 1 − π. The agent then has an expected utility function given by,
EU(YA,YB) = πu(YA) + (1 − π)u(YB).
Agents have an initial wealth y0 and can spend their time in either legitimate employment
or poaching. The fraction of time spent poaching is given by τ, with 1−τ the time spent
in legal employment. The fraction of a person’s time spent poaching, τ, can be interpreted
as the eﬀort spent on illegal harvesting.
Let x be the proportion of the species population carrying capacity that is alive.1 This
implies that at any given time x will between zero and one. The poaching production
function is then h(τ,x), which is assumed to be strictly monotonically increasing (SMI)
and strictly concave in both arguments. Poachers sell what they produce at a price p
(unless it is conﬁscated) and earn a wage w for time spent in legitimate employment.
These agents are assumed to be price takers in both markets so that time spent poaching
does not eﬀect the wage rate and vice versa. This implicitly assumes that poachers cannot
5make strategic decisions to alter the market prices of endangered species products.
If state A occurs agents’ production of the poached good is conﬁscated and they pay a
sanction δ(h(τ,x)). It is assumed that sanctions are linear and increasing in the amount
poached, which implies that δ′(h) > 0 and δ′′(h) = 0. The agents’ net incomes in the two
states are:
YA = y0 + w(1 − τ) − δ(h(τ,x))
YB = y0 + w(1 − τ) + ph(τ,x).
In a strict sense, poachers maximize the present discounted value of future utility,
  ∞
0 EUe−rtdt; however, since they have no property rights over the resource they are
poaching, they do not take into account its dynamics. The poacher’s problem simpliﬁes
to a static expected utility maximization problem. Assuming an interior solution, the
ﬁrst order condition can be expressed as:
hτ [(1 − π)p − πδ
′(h)] = w. (1)
Equation (1) simply states that the expected marginal beneﬁt of time spent poaching
equals the marginal opportunity cost. Implicitly deﬁned by equation (1) is the solution
to the poacher’s problem, τ∗(x,p,π,δ′,w). The poacher’s optimal choice is not explicitly
a function of time, as no account is taken of the resource dynamics. It is a static optimal
that will vary over time only as a consequence of ﬂuctuations in the exogenous variables.
A condition describing whether or not poaching will occur in terms of the price of the
poached resource can be derived from the ﬁrst order condition:





= p if τ > 0
> p if τ = 0
(2)
In the remainder of this paper the LHS of (2) will be deﬁned as z(τ∗,x) such that if poach-
ing occurs p = z(τ∗,x). This condition will be used in §2.3 to examine the implications
6of a reservation price on the demand for endangered species products.
2.2 Endangered Species Dynamics
The dynamics of the endangered species are governed by the diﬀerential equation:
˙ x = g(x) − h(τ
∗,x), (3)
where g(x), the species’ growth, is assumed to be dispensational with minimum viable
population level m such that g(x) < 0 if x < m.2 For any x > m the sign of ˙ x will depend
on the relative magnitudes of g(x) and h(τ∗,x). If g(x) > h(τ∗,x) then ˙ x > 0, and the
opposite if g(x) < h(τ∗,x). Examples of the appropriate phase diagrams are found in
ﬁgure 1 (as explained below).
2.3 Supply, Demand and the Market for Endangered Species Products
Demand for the endangered species product is given by a continuous function D(p),
where D′(p) < 0, with the market clearing when supply equals demand. The supply of
the endangered species product is some fraction of the total illegal harvest. The fraction
of the poached product that is supplied to the market depends upon the proportion of
the poached resources that are conﬁscated through anti-poaching enforcement, and the
proportion of those conﬁscations that are legally sold. It is assumed that the expected
poacher apprehension rate π is realized, so π is also the fraction of the poached harvest
that is conﬁscated. The proportion of resources conﬁscated from poachers that is not sold
in the market is given by φ ∈ [0,1]. The supply of endangered species products is given
by (1−φπ)h(τ∗,x), such that if φ = 1 none of the conﬁscated resources reach the market
and if φ = 0 all do. The market clearing condition is then,
D(p) = (1 − φπ)h(τ
∗,x). (4)
7Assume that there is some ﬁnite reservation price p = pR such that D(p ≥ pR) =
0. This is the price at which endangered species products are expensive enough that
consumers are just indiﬀerent between purchasing them and not purchasing them. The
existence of pR is an assumption that is critical to the analysis because it is required to
deﬁne an important point on the function h(τ∗,x).
Equation (2) gave a condition for the price of the endangered species product when
poaching occurs, which could be be expressed as p = z(τ∗,x). The existence of pR implies
that, ceteris paribus, there is some reservation endangered species population xR at which
pR = z(τ∗,xR). This reservation population is the one at which the species is scarce
enough that the price at which poachers are just willing to supply endangered species
products is equal to the price at which consumers are just indiﬀerent between purchasing
and not purchasing the products. It is at xR that h(τ∗,x) = 0 as is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Assuming that the marginal product of poaching time is zero if the endangered species
is extinct (hτ(τ,0) = 0), from equation (2.b), limx→0z(τ∗,x) = ∞. In order that pR be
ﬁnite, as it is assumed to be, it must be the case that xR > 0. This means, very sensibly,
that in order for the price of the endangered species product to be high enough to induce
poaching, and low enough to induce consumption, there must be a positive resource
population.
2.4 Steady-State Equilibria
A steady-state solution is characterized by ˙ x = 0, which implies g(x) = h(τ∗,x). The
market clearing condition D(p) = (1 − φπ)h(τ∗,x) must also hold. There are many
possible scenarios regarding the relative shapes of h(τ∗,x) and g(x), leading to many
possible steady state equilibria. For the current purposes is will suﬃce to examine two
sets of scenarios: xR ≥ m and xR < m. The usefulness of the distinction between these
scenarios is that the species can only be made extinct by poaching if xR < m.
8Figure 1 illustrates in phase diagrams an example of each of these scenarios. In the
ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 1 the only steady state equilibira if poaching occurs is at x = x∗.3
This would be a desirable outcome as the species is in a stable positive steady state. In
the second panel the species is endangered as the only steady-state equilibrium is x = 0.4
In this case, poaching will push the resource to extinction.
A species that is on an extinction path is one whose dynamics will push the species
to x = 0. If the species population is initially at some x0 greater than the minimum
viable population, the species can only become extinct if poaching pushes the population
below the m. For this to occur the amount of the species poached will have to exceed
natural reproduction for all population levels from some x < m up to x = x0. If natural
reproduction is greater than or equal to poaching for any species population in that range
then there will be a steady state at a population greater than m that prevents extinction.
This is why extinction can only occur if xR < m. Intuitively, if the minimum resource
population required to sustain poaching is greater than the minimum viable population,
then poaching will never push the species population below the point at which it cannot
recover.
3 Analysis of Policy Alternatives
3.1 Sanctions
Recall that the sanctions paid by poachers, if caught, are linear in the amount that they
poach. An increase in the penalties levied against poachers is equivalent to increasing the
slope of the sanction schedule, δ′(h). In this section the eﬀect of changing the slope of the
sanction schedule is explored in some detail, as is the eﬃcacy of shoot on sight policies,
which are modeled as δ′(h) approaching inﬁnity.
Figure 2 plots poaching time against the slope of the sanction schedule, and the price
9of endangered species products against supply and demand. An increase in sanctions
from δ′
0 to δ′
1 initially causes movement along the τ0 curve. Optimal poaching time falls
from its initial level of τ∗
0. This decrease in poaching time feeds into the market for the
endangered species product through an upward shift of the supply curve from S0(p) to
S1(p). There is a price increase associated with this supply shift, which feeds back to the
poacher’s decision. The poaching time curve shifts up from τ0, resulting in an increase in
optimal poaching time. These feedbacks continue until an equilibrium is reached. This
graphical analysis does not adequately show that the new equilibrium τ∗
1 will be less
than τ∗
0, although that result emerges analytically. The results that price increases and
quantity sold in the market decreases also emerge.
3.1.1 Static Analysis
A more rigorous treatment of the above intuition involves the development of a system
of equations from the model components built in section two of this paper. Speciﬁcally,
an expression for ∂τ/∂δ′ is derived by implicitly diﬀerentiating the poacher’s ﬁrst order
condition (equation (1)). A second expression, for ∂p/∂δ′, is derived by implicitly dif-
ferentiating the market clearing condition (equation (4)). The two expressions form a
system of two equations and two unknowns as follows:
∂τ/∂δ′ = [πhτ − (1 − π)hτ(∂p/∂δ′)]/[hττ((1 − π)p − πδ′)]
∂p/∂δ′ = −[(1 − φπ)hτ(∂τ/∂δ′)]/[(1 − φπ)hττp − D′(p)].
Each of the above equations has two components: a direct component and a feedback
component. In the numerator of the top expression, the ﬁrst term represents direct eﬀects
on τ from the increase in sanctions, and the second term represents indirect feedback
eﬀects. In relation to ﬁgure 2, the direct eﬀects can be thought of as the movement along
the τ0 curve, and the feedback eﬀects can be thought of as the curve shifting up from τ0
to τ1.
10By solving the above system of two equations and two unknowns, the changes in
poaching time and price can be found:
∂τ/∂δ
′ = [πhτ((1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p))]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] < 0 (5)
∂p/∂δ
′ = [−π(1 − φπ)h
2
τ]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] > 0. (6)
Equations (5) and (6) reveal that in equilibrium poaching time will fall and the price
will rise if there is an increase in the slope of the sanction schedule. This implies that
the direct impact on the poacher’s optimal choice from an increase in δ′ outweighs the
indirect eﬀect from the price increase and poaching time is reduced.
3.1.2 Dynamic Analysis
Consider a scenario in which a species is on an extinction path, but can still be saved.
Recall from section 2.4 that, to be on an extinction path, it must be that xR < m, and
that, ceteris paribus, the species will enter a steady state at x = 0. An example of such a
scenario is illustrated in the second panel of ﬁgure 1. If it is still possible for the species
to be saved then it must be that the population is still at least as big as the minimum
viable population (x ≥ m).
From the static analysis, poaching time decreases as a result of an increase in sanctions.
This decrease is independent of the species population, i.e. ∂τ/∂δ′ < 0 ∀x. Since the
poacher’s harvest function h(τ,x) is increasing in τ, the harvest function will shift down
from its initial level to some h(τ,x)′. When the harvest function shifts downward, the
point at which it intersects the x axis will shift to the right. This implies that the
reservation species population increases from xR to a new point x′
R. The species will be
11saved if the increase in the reservation species population is large enough that x′
R ≥ m.
Figure 3 provides a phase diagram to illustrate this scenario. Initially the model is as
illustrated in panel two of ﬁgure 1, with a species population x0 > m. The species is on an
extinction path, but can still be saved since the population is greater than the minimum
viable population. The slope of the sanction schedule is increased, causing the harvest
function to shift down to h(τ,x)′, and the reservation species population to increase to
x′
R. The bottom panel of ﬁgure three shows that the movements in the top panel cause
the ˙ x function to rotate up. Since it is assumed that x′
R > m, the ˙ x function rises enough
to become positive over over a range of x values. Included in that range is x0, thus the
change in species population reverses and x begins to grow. The species ultimately arrives
in a steady state at x∗.
3.1.3 Shoot to Kill Policies
If only the welfare of the individual poacher is considered, the death penalty for poaching
can be represented by δ′ = ∞. If the welfare of an entire family is considered, the death
of one member may not be an inﬁnite penalty, so this may not be the best way to model
shoot on sight policies. It could be the case that poachers consider the expected utility of
their family in their decisions to poach. In that case the utility loss due to death would
only be the foregone earnings of the poacher, and not the extreme loss one would associate
with their own death.
If δ′(h) = ∞, then according to equation (2) the market price of the endangered species
product would also have to be ∞ for poaching to occur. Since the reservation price of
consumers is assumed to be ﬁnite, this will not occur and poaching will be eradicated.
If a shoot on sight policy is not equivalent to δ′ = ∞, due to family or community
considerations, then it is not entirely clear what the outcome of a shoot on sight policy
would be. The outcome might be a strong steepening of the sanction schedule with results
as given above. An important note in this context is that if policy makers wish to pursue
12sanctions as a means of saving an endangered species, they will need to ensure that the
shift of the harvest function is big enough so that x′
R ≥ m. One can conjecture that the
implementation of a shoot on sight policy would create the largest possible shift in the
harvest function and associated increase in the reservation species population.
3.2 Anti-Poaching Enforcement
Analysis of an increase in enforcement proceeds in much the same fashion as an increase
in sanctions. Similar to ﬁgure 2, poaching time can be indicated by a downward sloping
function of the probability of detection (π). When there is an increase in π, there is a
movement down the τ0 curve, decreasing poaching time. This constricts supply and shifts
the supply curve up, reducing the quantity sold and increasing the price. This feeds back
into the poacher’s optimal choice through an upward shift of the poaching time curve
to τ1. Unlike the case of sanctions in ﬁgure 2, the direction of the equilibrium change
in τ∗ cannot be determined as it depends on the elasticity of demand. The change in
equilibrium price and quantity sold in the market increase and decrease respectively, as
shown in the static analysis below. In the dynamic analysis it is shown that at the point
xR the change in τ can be determined, from which important dynamic results follow.
3.2.1 Static Analysis
The poacher’s optimal choice is implicitly diﬀerentiated to yield an expression for ∂τ/∂π,
and the market clearing condition is implicitly diﬀerentiated to give an expression for
∂p/∂π. The optimal poaching time derivative can be separated into direct eﬀects that
push τ∗ along the poaching time curve, and indirect price eﬀects that shift the poaching
time curve up. These two expressions form a system of two equations and two unknowns
just as in the static analysis of sanctions. Solving the system of equations gives the
13following results:
∂τ/∂π = [((1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p))hτ(p + δ
′) − (1 − π)φhτh]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] ≷ 0 (7)




[hττ[(1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ)]w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] > 0 (8)
Equation (7) shows that the net change in poaching time is uncertain. With some re-
arrangement this equation can be written in terms of the elasticity of demand, deﬁned
as ǫ = −D′(p)p/D(p). This re-arrangement is given in equation (9), which shows that,
if demand is inelastic enough, poaching time will increase as a result of increased en-
forcement. The threshold elasticity at which the direction of change is reversed is not,
however, simply unity as previous authors have found (Fischer 2004). The reason is that
equation (9) reﬂects the complexities of the costs and beneﬁts that poachers face:
∂τ/∂π = [hτ(ǫ(1 + (δ
′/p)) + (1 − φπ)(hττp(p + δ
′(h)) − (1 − π)φ))]/
[D(p)
−1(hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ)] (9)
This indicates that there is a relationship between the elasticity of demand and the eﬃcacy
of increased enforcement.
3.2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis of increased anti-poaching enforcement will not be as straightforward
as in the case of sanctions because, unlike equation (5), equation (7) is ambiguous. As
before, it is assumed that the species is initially on an extinction path, but that it can
still be saved. The species has an initial population x0 > m, but, ceteris paribus, will end
up in a steady state equilibrium at x = 0 (extinction).
14The key to this analysis is that the direction of the change in τ∗ can be determined
at the point xR. Evaluating equation (7) at that point gives a strictly negative result.
Poaching time decreases when anti-poaching enforcement increases if the species is just
at the reservation population. The intuition for this result can be seen by recalling that
when the species is at the reservation population, the price of endangered species products
will be at the reservation demand price. At pR, demand is perfectly elastic. Equation
(9) shows that only if demand is inelastic enough will the change in poaching time be
positive, but at the point pR that is not the case:
∂τ/∂π|x=xR = [((1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p))hτ(p + δ
′)]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] < 0. (10)
Since the change in poaching time at xR is negative, the poacher’s harvest function shifts
down at that point. The downward shift at xR implies that the reservation resource
population must increase to some higher level. Since the harvest function is SMI and
concave in x, there must be a new point x′
R at which the harvest function intersects the
x axis such that x′
R > xR. Rather intuitively, if the probability that the poacher will get
caught increases, the minimum species population required to induce her to poach will
increase.
It is not clear what will happen to harvest for other values of x. For larger values of
x, demand would become more inelastic and the poacher would supply more. In ﬁgure 4
the case where harvest would increase for larger values of x when enforcement increases
is illustrated.
Figure 4 also demonstrates the potential dynamic implications of increasing anti-
poaching enforcement. If the species is on an extinction path, it can still be saved if
the increase in enforcement leads to a large enough increase in the reservation species
population such that xR ≥ m. If this occurs the dynamics of the model will change to
15the extent that the species will evolve to a positive steady state rather than an extinction
steady state. In ﬁgure 4 the increase in enforcement, and the associated increase in the
reservation species population to x′
R, cause the species to evolve to a steady state at x∗.
As mention above, ﬁgure 4 also illustrates the ambiguity of the change in harvest when
anti-poaching enforcement increases. The result that the species will not become extinct,
despite the uncertainty associated with the change in poaching, highlights the need to
examine species dynamics and not just poaching quantities. The result that the endan-
gered species can potentially be saved by an increase in anti-poaching enforcement is an
important addition to the static results.
3.3 International Trade Moratorium
A critical feature of any trade moratorium will be a link to improved anti-poaching en-
forcement if the moratorium is successfully to reduce poaching (Heltberg 2001). The most
obvious way in which a trade ban can improve enforcement is through the elimination of
laundering possibilities (Fischer 2004). Without a trade ban legal sales of products may
occur, often administered by government. Through corruption of government oﬃcials,
or other means, poachers may be able to launder illegal products into legal markets. A
trade ban may also make customs oﬃcials in receiving countries more eﬃcient in detect-
ing poached products, since any product they encounter will automatically be considered
contraband. The impact of a trade ban on poaching and the viability of the endangered
species will hinge on whether or not the moratorium improves eﬀective anti-poaching
enforcement.
The implementation of a trade ban is identical to forcing the proportion of conﬁscated
goods sold in the market to be zero. This can be represented in the model by a shift from
some φ < 1 to φ = 1 (recall that φ is the proportion of conﬁscations not sold). If the
implementation of a moratorium is to impact enforcement positively, then enforcement
16must be an increasing function of the proportion of conﬁscations not sold, i.e. π(φ) and
πφ > 0. Results are derived by examining the impacts of small changes in φ, but the
implementation of a trade ban may be a large change in φ. The results relating to small
changes in φ will generally not depend on the magnitude of φ itself, and thus be indicative
of a larger change and the implementation of a trade moratorium.
Figure 5 illustrates graphically the static interactions between the poacher’s decision
and the market for the endangered species product. The ﬁrst panel illustrates the relation-
ship between π and φ, which is assumed to be positive, implying that a trade moratorium
improves enforcement. The implementation of the trade ban causes a movement along
π(φ), increasing enforcement from π0 to π1. This increase in enforcement causes a move-
ment down the τ0 curve reducing poaching time. In the goods market the supply curve
shifts up because the ban reduces supply and less time is spent poaching. The price
increase that results from the upward supply curve shift feeds back into the poacher’s op-
timal choice through an upward shift in the poaching time curve to τ1. The magnitude of
the upward shift of the poaching time curve will dictate whether poaching time increases
or decreases in equilibrium. This change is ambiguous, except when the species is at the
reservation population (xR).
Notice that if π has no relationship with φ, poaching time will unambiguously rise
in equilibrium. In this scenario there would be no movement along the poaching time
curve due to enforcement increases, but the supply curve would still shift upwards due to
the trade ban, as all conﬁscated goods are removed from the market. The poaching time
curve would shift up, and since π would be held constant, poaching time would increase.
3.3.1 Static Analysis
The analysis of a trade ban relies on examining small changes in φ and noting that they
hold for all φ. By implicitly diﬀerentiating the poacher’s ﬁrst order condition and the
17market clearing condition, the following system is are derived:
∂τ/∂φ = [hτπφ(p + δ
′(h)) − hτ(1 − π)(∂p/∂φ)]/[hττ((1 − π)p − πδ
′(h))]
∂p/∂φ = [h(π + φπφ) − (1 − φπ)hτ(∂τ/∂φ)]/[(1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p)]
The diﬀerent eﬀects outlined in the graphical analysis (ﬁgure 5) can be identiﬁed in the
above expressions. In the numerator of the ﬁrst expression there are two terms. The
ﬁrst gives the changes in optimal poaching time that result from enforcement increases.
These are the changes that cause movement along the poaching time curve. The second
term in the ﬁrst expression represents the price related upward shift in the poaching time
curve due to supply reductions. The second expression gives the changes in the price level
resulting from the trade moratorium. The ﬁrst term represents direct supply reductions
due to the removal of conﬁscated products from the market. The second term represents
the eﬀect of changes in the poacher’s optimal choice on the price. If the poacher reduces
her time allocation then the price rises further, but if she increases her time allocation due
to the aforementioned price rise, the price increase is somewhat reduced. The equilibrium
results are as follows:
∂τ/∂φ = [((1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p))hτπφ(p + δ
′) − (1 − π)(π + φπφ)hτh]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] ≷ 0 (11)
∂p/∂φ = [hττh((1 − π)p − πδ




[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] > 0. (12)
The net impact on τ∗ from a small change in φ, given by equation (11), is ambiguous.
The sign of (11) is not aﬀected by φ itself, so the impact the imposition of a trade
moratorium on poaching time is ambiguous. If the second term of equation (11) is smaller
than the ﬁrst, then the expression will be negative. If harvest is equal to zero, then the
18second term is equal to zero, and the expression is negative, but, if harvest is large the
opposite may happen. Equation (12) shows that the price unambiguously rises. This is a
consequence of the two sources of supply reduction explained in ﬁgure 5.
If there is no relationship between enforcement and conﬁscations, such that πφ = 0,
then equation (11) is unambiguously positive. This means that, if a trade moratorium
does not impact enforcement, it will increase poaching levels. This is because only changes
the poacher’s optimal choice would be the result of a price increase, which increases the
marginal beneﬁt of poaching time.
3.3.2 Dynamic Results
The dynamic results hinge on the assumption that πφ > 0. If this is true, the results are
very similar to the those for an increase in enforcement. If the assumption does not hold
then the dynamic result is simply an increase in the speed at which the species becomes
extinct.
As with the previous dynamic policy analyses, it is assumed that the species is on
an extinction path, but can still be saved. The initial state of the model is like the one
depicted in the second panel of ﬁgure 1 in which poaching is going to drive the species to
extinction. It is assumed, however, that the initial species population is greater than the
minimum viable population (x0 > m).
The result of a trade moratorium is to shift the harvest function. Equation (11)
indicates that the direction of the shift is uncertain, although at the point xR the shift
will be downward (assuming πφ > 0). The intuition is exactly as it was in the case of
an increase in enforcement. If the species population is at the reservation population,
the price of endangered species products must be the reservation price. At that price,
demand is perfectly elastic and the price will not rise as supply is reduced. Equation (13)
19gives (11) evaluated at the point x = xR.
∂τ/∂φ|x=xR = [((1 − φπ)hττp − D
′(p))hτπφ(p + δ
′)]/
[hττ((1 − φπ)τp − (D
′(p)/hτ))w − (1 − π)(1 − φπ)h
2
τ] < 0 (13)
If it were the case that πφ = 0 then equation (13) would be zero, and there would be no
movement in the harvest function at the point xR.
For the case when πφ > 0, the properties of the harvest function and the downward
shift at xR imply that there will be a new reservation species population x′
R > xR. If
the increase in the reservation species population is suﬃciently large that x′
R > m, then
the species will be saved from extinction. Graphically this case is exactly as that of an
increase in enforcement (see ﬁgure 4). The increase in the reservation species population
causes the ˙ x function to become positive over a range of x values, causing the species to
enter a stable positive steady state, rather than become extinct.
If it were the case that πφ = 0, then the harvest function would rotate upwards.
This would cause the ˙ x function to rotate downwards, speeding up the species’ path to
extinction. Intuitively, in this case the trade ban would increase poaching causing the
species to become extinct faster.
The dynamic impact when πφ > 0 provides a reasonable explanation for the dynamics
of elephant populations in recent years. Prior to the introduction of the international
ivory trade ban, elephant populations were dwindling and were arguably on an extinction
path. As Fischer (2004) and van Kooten (2007) point out, there is some evidence that
the elephant population has stabilized and begun to recover since the introduction of the
trade ban. This analysis suggests that the trade ban has changed the economic conditions
faced by poachers to the extent that there has been a change in the equilibrium path of
elephants. The trade ban on ivory products may have improved anti-poaching enforcement
in some manner and so caused the reservation elephant population to rise. It appears this
20increase may have been large enough to prevent elephants from going extinct.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Improved anti-poaching enforcement, increased sanctions and international trade mora-
toriums can potentially serve to save a species that would otherwise become extinct.
The results of this study have also re-iterated the ﬁnding of past authors that increased
anti-poaching enforcement and trade moratoriums have ambiguous impacts on poaching.
However, this study has added the important result that the survival of an endangered
species may be aided by these policies despite the ambiguous static results. These results
have emerged because of the structure of the model employed in analysis. By combining
a basic model of criminal behavior and a standard dynamic natural resources framework,
the intricacies of the relationship between poachers and endangered species emerge.
The results in this paper provide some evidence in favour of an ivory trade ban, even
though it would result in exceptionally high ivory prices, which create perverse incentives
for poachers. The analytical results indicate that despite large price increases, the policy
still has the potential to prevent elephant extinction.
It was noted in §3.1.3 that shoot to kill policies will eliminate illegal harvesting if
poacher’s consider only their own utility, although poaching may not be eliminated if
family or community utility is considered. In nations, such as Kenya, where shoot to kill
policies have been implemented, poaching is still observed, but in lesser amounts. This
suggests that poachers do consider family well-being in their decisions, and shoot to kill
policies are not equivalent to δ′ → ∞.
In terms of the assumptions driving the model, three warrant futher discussion: risk-
neutral poachers, dispensational population growth and the existence of a reservation
demand price. The assumption of risk-neutrality is necessary to make the model tractable.
Poachers are likely to be less risk-averse than the average person and may even be risk
21takers given the nature of the activity; thus risk neutral may be a compromise assumption,
but that is pure conjecture. The problem with alternative risk assumptions is that they
lead to ambiguous results that depend on the relative magnitudes of the parameters. A
reformulation of the model, perhaps numerically with explicit functional forms, would
help sort out the alternative assumptions, but this is left for future research.
The assumption of dispensational growth departs from traditionally assumed logistic
growth in that it assumes a certain minimum viable population. For most endangered
species there is a strong argument for a lower bound of two on the minimum viable
population, and many biologists suggest m ≈ 1000 for mammals, making this a reasonable
assumption. There is a stronger argument to be made against logistic growth as it would
require that for extinction to occur, poachers be willing to spend time poaching until the
species population is extinct, even if the population is very small. This would require
that the price received by poachers approach inﬁnity, which does not seem plausible.
Dispensational growth allows the species to become extinct, while its value remains ﬁnite.
The ability of the price of the endangered species products to become inﬁnite is pre-
vented in the model by the assumption of a reservation demand price. This assumption
is supported by the implausibility of the price of endangered species products approach-
ing inﬁnity. Even for products, such as those coming from rhinoceros horns, that are
highly coveted, budget constraints limit the extent to which the price can increase. There
is an upper bound to the reservation price, which then deﬁnes the reservation species
population which is so vital to the analysis.
Future research into endangered species poaching needs to be able to analyze wel-
fare eﬀects in order to examine policy options in a more complete manner than done in
this study. The contributions of this paper in terms of species dynamics are important,
but they do not help to determine what the best policy alternatives are from a welfare
standpoint. Models that capture the welfare of all those with interests in the endangered
22species (not just poachers) need to be developed in order to compare policies adequately.
The present model cannot possibly compare a trade moratorium to a shoot on sight policy
in terms of welfare. A model in which the costs and beneﬁts of each can be compared
is needed, although this would not be a simple exercise. A last consideration for future
research is the examination of how directing revenue from the sale of conﬁscated goods
into anti-poaching enforcement compares to the enforcement gains derived from a trade
ban.
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Notes
1Kremer and Morcom (2000) use the same proportion structure in their analysis.
2This of course does not rule out logistic growth if m = 0.
3Two other steady states are x = m and x = 0, but poaching cannot result in these equilibria.
4It is possible to have xR < m, and h(τ∗,x) ≯ g(x) ∀x ∈ (m,1), in which case there would be some
positive steady state, but the possibility of extinction would still exist.
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